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The time limited on a railroad ticket for the completion of
the trip must, in order to be bindiiig, allow sufficient time for
a person using ordinary diligence to accomplish
rriers
Limited
the trip: Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., (Court of Civil
Ticket

Appeals of Texas,) 30 S. W. Rep. 294.

A very peculiar decision on a somewhat similar point was
rendered a year or so ago by the Court of Errors and Appeals
of New Jersey, against the dissent of Justices MAGIE, ABBETT,
BROWN and KREUG-R.o The plaintiff had bought an excursion

ticket from R. to M. and return, "via B. Branch," "not good
to stop off en route." The road from R. to B., where it was
necessary to change cars, was the main line, and that from
B. to M. was the B. Branch. On his return from M. the
plaintiff would have been obliged, if his train were on
schedule time, to wait in the B. station for half an hour for a
train to R. Half a mile from B., however, his train had to
wait to allow a belated train to pass.

The plaintiff then left
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the train, and walked to B., arriving there in time to catch the
belated train. But the majority of the court held thpat he had
no right to do this, under the conditions of his ticket; that the
belated train was not a connecting train, and the ticket was not
good on it; and that therefore he was liable to pay fare: Penna.
R. R. 6o. v. Parry, 27 AtI Rep. 914. This, however, would
seem to be an utterly indefensible ruling. It does not appear
that one of the conditions of the ticket was that it should be
good only on connecting trains, and his walk to the station
from the point where the train stopped could hardly be called
.a stop-off, as he in fact anticipated his train. One cannot but
-wonder what the learned judges who decided this case would
have held if his train had been so delayed as to render it
,impossible to get home before the time limit expired. Probably
,they would have said that it was his duty to start the day
;before.
In the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachuetts, the rule that a person who by mistake takes a wrong
train is not obliged to pay for his ride to the first
Fares,
Taking Wrong station at which he has an opportunity to alight,
Train
does not apply to one who has a season ticket, and
takes a train in the belief that it is good on that train ; if not
,entitled to ride on that ticket on that train, the company may
recover fare: New York & N. E. R. R. Co. v. Feely, 4o N. E.
Rep. 20..
The Supreme Court of Vermont has recenfly held, that an
-agreement by which the plaintiff is to take certain notes, collect them at his own expense without charge to
the owner, and divide the amount collected with
-the latter, under which agreement he had implied authority
to bring suits, is champertous and therefore void: Flamilton
v. Gray, 31 Atl. Rep.- 315.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has. lately decided a
very important question of constitutional law, in Short v.
The Public Local
ConstitutionalLaw, State, 31 Ati. Rep. 322.
.Compulsory Labor, Laws of that State, Art. 10, §§ 268-270,
Roads
imposed upon persons residing in Dor-

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

,Chester county two days, at least, of compulsory labor in
-every year, for the purpose of keeping the roads in repair,
with.the privilege of furnishing a substitute, or of paying a
certain sum per day in lieu of personal labor. This act was
.held to be constitutional, not being such a poll-tax as is pro.hibited by the constitution, nor being in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, as that does not control the power of a State over its
own citizens.
Such an act is not unconstitutional as denying the right of
trial by jury: Haney v. Board of Comrs. of Barton Co., 91
Ga. 770; S. C., 18 S. E. Rep. 28, nor is it in violation of a
constitutional provision that no poll-tax shall be levied for
county or state purposes, or of a provision of the bill of
Tights that there shall be no involuntary servitude in the
state: Dennis v. Simon, (Ohio,) 36 N. E. Rep. 832.
Persons cannot be indicted jointly, however, for failing to
-work on a public road or to pay the statutory sum in lieu
.thereof: State v. Wainriht,(Supreme Court of Arkansas,)
29 S. W. Rep. 981.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Missouri, in Exparte O'Brien, 30 S. W. Rep. 158, when a court
issues a commitment for one charged with interrupting its proceedings by making a murderous assault
Commitment upon a person named in the
court's immediate
Contempt,

Validity of

presence without rendering any judgment, or ordering one to be
entered before the commitment, adjudicating that the respondent had been guilty of contempt, the commitment is illegal;
and a commitment for such cause is also illegal, when the proof
shows that the assault, which was made in an attempt to arrest
the person assaulted, occurred in the rotunda outside of the
court-room, and that because of a swinging door, the density
of the crowd, and the near-sightedness of the judge, he could
not have seen the occurrence, and that his subsequent
inquiries showed that he did not, in fact, see it.
When a company, composed of a large number of local
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milk dealers, which is incorporated for the purpose of "buyingContract

and selling milk at wholesale and retail," but only-

in Restraint
dF Trade,
Trust

acts as a seller's agent to find purchasers, charging the former a commission for that service,.

adopts and acts under a by-law giving the board
of directors the power to fix the price to be paid by the stockholders for milk, the company is an unlawful combination to.
control the price of milk: Peo. v. Milk Exchange, Ltd., (Court.
of Appeals of New York,) 39 N. E. Rep. io62; affirming 29.

N. Y. Suppl. 259.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in State of California v. So. Pac. CO., 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 591, has recently
Courts,
Supreme
Court of the
United States.
Original
Jurisdiction

decided, (i) That when an original case is pending

in that court, to be there disposed of in the first
instance, and in the exercise of an exceptional
jurisdiction, it is not befitting the gravity and
finality of its adjudication to proceed to judgment

in the absence of parties whose rights would be in effect.
determined thereby, even though they might not, in subsequent litigation in other tribunals, be technically bound; and.
therefore, when such absent parties cannot be made parties to,
the suit without ousting the jurisdiction of the court, the case
will be dismissed; and (2) That the original jurisdiction of the.
Supreme Court in cases between a state and a citizen of another
state rests solely in the character of the parties, and not at all
on the nature of the case; and therefore, when the parties are
not such as are prescribed by the constitution, the jurisdiction
cannot be aided by showing that a federal question is involved.
Justices HARLAN and BREWER dissented from the former of
these propositions.

When a deed, delivered in escrow, is fraudulently abstracted
from the depositary by the grantee, without perDeed,
nscrow,
Fraudulent
Possession by

Grantee

forming the conditions on which it was to be

delivered to him, it is void, even in the hands.

of a bona fide purchaser of the land granted:

Jackson v. Lynn, (Supreme Court of Iowa,) 62 N. W..
Rep. 704.
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The Supreme Court of Missouri has lately held, against the
,dissent of Chief Justice BLAcK, and Judges MACFARLANE and
Dower,
GANTT, that since the wife's inchoate right of dower
Extinction, is defeated by the acquisition of land by a railroad,
Deed to
Railroad

by condemnation proceedings, and also by a conveyance by the husband to the company of a right of way
without joining her in the deed, she will be barred of her
-dower in land conveyed immediately in fee to a third party
without her joining, but ultimately conveyed by a subsequent
graitee to the railroad company, by a deed purporting to be
in fee; because such a deed, in Missouri, conveys only an
easement in the right of way: Chouteau v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.,
30 S. W. Rep. 299; Baker v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. Co.,
29 S. W. Rep. 301. The logic of this is not apparent; and
it is only necessary to read the profound and exhaustive dissenting opinion of BLACK, C. J., in the latter case, to be convinced of its injustice.
According to a recent. decision of the Supreme Court of
Vermont, when two water rights on opposite sides of a stream
are owned by one person, and the spent water
Easement,
Creation
from the mills on one side of the stream has been
discharged below the dam that fed the mills on the other side,
the right to so discharge the spent water will continue, upon
-the owner's death, and the division of the estate in severalty
among the respective heirs, by which the water right became
vested in differentpersons : Mason v. Horton, 31 Atl. Rep. 291.

An act prohibiting the printing in more than one column,
-on the official ballot, the name of a candidate who has received
the nomination of two or more parties, is constituElections,
Ballots
tional, under a provision that the legislature shall
have power "to pass laws to preserve the purity of elections
and guard against abuses of the elective franchise:" Todd v.
Board of Election Commissioners, (Supreme Court of Michigan,)
62 N. W. Rep. 564.
The Supreme Court of New York, First Department, has
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again decided, following its former decision in Goodinman v.
Bainton, 31 N. Y. Suppl. 1043, that under the,
Voters,
Constitution of New York, Art. 2, § 3, which proStudents
vides that, for purposes of voting, no person shall be deemed
to have gained a residence while a student in any seminary of
learning, it is immaterial that a student has no other domicilethan the seminary: In re Garvey 32 N. Y. Suppl. 689. But
FOLLETT, J., who did not sit on the hearing of the former case,
dissents in a very able opinion, which serves to throw a strong
doubt upon the majority decision. All other considerations
apart, it is hardly to be believed that the constitution intended
to disfranchise any citizen, and yet this is the practical effect'
of such a decision. It will not do to put this aside by any
plea of the duty of the courts to administer the law, regardlessof consequences, or any reliance upon the worm-eaten maxim
of "ita lex scrzftta est." Courts are presumed to use common
sense, if nothing else, in the construction of both statutes and
constitutions, and to adopt the construction most consonant
therewith. To allow such a voter the privilege of the franchise, which the constitution professes to secure him, is certainly doing no violence to the spirit of that document, while
to blindly adhere to the letter thereof is, in this case, a flagrant example of sticking in the bark. It is to be hoped that
the Court of Appeals will take a more liberal view of the case.
As an ordinary rule, a student does not change his domicile
by occasional residence at college: Granby v. Amherst,
7 Mass. I; but the mere facts that a student, who has a.
domicile in one town, resides at a public institution in another
town for the sole purpose of obtaining an education, and
that he has his means of support from another place, do not
constitute the sole test of his right to vote in the latter town.
The right of suffrage is acquired only by change of domicile,
and the question of change of domicile is to be decided by all
the circumstances of the case. If the father is living and
the son remains a member of his family, returns to his
home to pass his vacations, and is maintained by his father,
these circumstances will rebut any presumption of a change ;
but, if, on the other hand, the father is dead, and he
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passes his vacation elsewhere than at his father's former
home, or if he describes himself as of such a place, and,
otherwise shows an intention to continue there, then a presumption of change will arise: In re Opinion of Judges,
5 Metc., (Mass.,) 587. The presumption, however, is against
the change, and merely calling a place a person's residence
does not make it so: Sanders v. Getchell, 76 Me. 158. Nor
will the payment of road taxes while attending college have
any weight in determining the question of residence, when the
statute imposing the tax requires only inhabitancy,and not
residence, as the condition of liability thereto : Dale v. Irwin,
78 IIl. 170 ; and one who becomes a resident of a county for
the purpose of attending college, and who has formed no,
intention of remaining after the completion of his college
course, is not entitled to vote in that county : Vanderpool vO'Hanlon, 53 Iowa, 246; S. C., 5 N. W. Rep. I19.
A student at a theological seminary, however, being of age,
and otherwise qualified to vote, and being also emancipated
from his father's family, may vote in the town in which the
seminary is situated: Putnam v. Johnson, IO Mass. 488. An
undergraduate of a college, free from parental control, who
regards the place where the college is situated as his home,
and who has no other home to which to return in case of
sickness or domestic affliction, is as much entitled to vote as
any other resident of the town pursuing his usual vocation.
It is pro hac vice the student's home, his permanent abode in
the sense of the statutes : Dale v. Irwin, 78 Ill. 17o. So, if a
student in good faith elects to make the place where the
college is situated his home, to. the exclusion of all other
places, he may acquire a legal residence, though he may intend
to remove therefrom at some fixed time, or at some indefinite
period in the future: Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind. 148 ; S. C.,
13 N. E. Rep. 7oo. And even, (and this we commend to our
New York friends,) when the constitution provides that the
residence of a student at any seminary of learning shall not
entitle him to the right of suffrage in the town where such
seminary is situated, it does not prevent a student from gaining
a voting residence there if the other conditions concur. He
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does not gain a residence as a student, but in spite of that fact:
Sanders v. Getchell, 76 Me. 158.
(N. S.) 220.

See 2 AM. L. REG. & REV.

According to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, a
person illegally arrested, even though he'has acquiesced in the
arrest, may use such force as is necessary to
Homicide
Justifiable, regain his liberty; and if there is reasonable
Resisting
ground to believe that the officer intends to
Illegal Arrest
shoot to prevent his escape, may
shoot the officer

in self-defense: Mersv. State,

29

S. W. Rep. 1074.

An injunction will not lie to restrain a city from closing a
vacated and unimproved alley, ten to fifteen feet below street
forms but a small
Injunction, grade, when the plaintiff's land
Closing Alley, part of the block through which the alley runs,
Trivial
and fronts on a street, and all the other owners
Damage

desire to close it: Christian v. City of St. Louis,

(Supreme Court of Missouri,) 29 S. W. Rep. 996.
Judge Morrow, of the District Court for the Northern District of California, in a recent charge to the grand jury, has
interstate
Commerce,

Discrimina.
tion

Free Pass

asserted that an officer of a railroad company
engaged in interstate commerce, who, as a matter
of personal favor, issues a free pass for transportation from one state to another to a person not

within any of the exceptions contained in § 22 of the interstate commerce act, is guilty of unjust discrimination, in
violation of § 2 of that act: In re Charge to GrandJury, 66,
Fed. Rep. 146.

One who solicits others to join with him in the purchase of
a quantity of liquor, receives from each the money to pay for
Intoxicating

Liquors,
Sale

the share wanted by each, and afterwards -buys
and distributes the liquor among those who contributed to its purchase, is guilty of selling liquor

without a license: Hunter v. State, (Supreme Court of Arkansas,) 30 S. W. Rep. 42. HUGHES and RIDDICK, JJ., dissented,
with good reason. The objections to this decision are best
stated in the language of the former: " It does not appear
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from the evidence that the defendant had any interest in the
whisky sold by the distillery, that he was the agent of the distillery, or that he received any money for the whisky purchase,
.save as agent of those who joined him in the purchase, and
that what he received he paid over as agent for those interested
with him in the purchase, with what he contributed. . .. It
.seems clear, beyond question, that in this case there was no
.sale by the defendant, and that he purchased the five gallons
of whisky for himself and as the agent of others who joined
him in the purchase; that the purchase was a joint purchase,
,out of which the defendant made no profit, and in which he
had no interest, save, as stated, to the extent of his contribu•tion to buy jointly with others. It seems that to hold this
transaction.to be a sale by the defendant would be to violate
elementary principles of law and the plainest principles of
,reason."
The courts will take judicial notice of the last official United
States census, to determine the population of a
Judicial
county: State v. Marion County Court, (Supreme
Notice,
Census
Court of Missouri,) 30 S.W. Rep.
103.
This rule has been generally adopted: Hazwkins v. Thomas,
,(Ind.,) 29 N. E. Rep. 157; Bank v. Cheney, 94 Ill. 430; Peo. v.
Williams, 64 Cal. 87; S. C., 27 Pac. Rep. 939; Peo. v. Wong
Wang, (Cal.,) 28 Pac. Rep. 270; State v. Braskamp, (Iowa,)
54 N. W. Rep. 532 ; Guldin v. Schuylkill CO., 149 Pa. 210.
But it was rejected, on grounds of political expediency, by
-the Court of Appeals of New York, in Peo. v. Rice, 31 N.
E. Rep. 921.
The Supreme Court of Utah has decided, that an act providing that in civil cases a verdict may be rendered on the concurrence therein of nine or more members of the
Jury,
jury, is constitutional: AOackey v. .Enzensperger,
Majority
Verdict
39 Pac. Rep. 541.
This follows the decisions in Hess v. White, 9 Utah, 61.;
S. C., 33 Pac. Rep. 243, and Fred. W. Wolf Co. v. Salt Lake
City, (Utah,) 37 Pac. Rep. 262. But these cases stand almost
.alone, and the overwhelming weight of authority is, that in
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the absence of any constitutional provision the right of trial
by jury implies a right to the concurrent judgment of twelve
men upon the matter in issue, and that a statute authorizing
the rendition of a verdict by any less number is unconstitutional and void: Jacksonville, T. & K. TV.- Ry. Co. v. Adams,
33 Fla. 6o8; S. C., 15 So. Rep. 257; In re Opinion of
fustices, 41 N. H. 550; Carroll v. Byers, (Ariz.,) 36 Pac.

Rep. 499; Bradfordv. Territory, i Okl. 366; S. C., 34 Pac.
Rep. 66.
The full and carefully considered opinion in Hess v. White,,
however, presents the opposite view with much force. It
clearly disproves the conclusiveness of the argument that the
jury meant by the Constitution of the United States was oneof twelve jurors acting unanimously, since that was the only
jury known to the common law, by showing that other equally
essential qualifications of a common-law jury, (e. g., that the
-jurors should be freeholders,) though in full force at the
adoption of the Constitution, have now became obsolete, and
are not reckoned as essential to the right of trial by jury, and
points out the non-essential character of unanimity and the
advantages of the majority verdict in the following terse language: "\Wherever this provision has been tried, it has been
found to be a distinct benefit. Such a provision is simply a
change in the procedure of applying legal remedies. It is.
general in its application; it is fair and just to all. No man's,
property rights are injured by it, and no man can be said to
have a vested right in the unanimous action of a jury, any
more than in the fact that a juror was anciently required to'
be a freeholder. All litigants could waive, in civil trials at
common law, and under our constitution, this unaminity of
verdict. If they could waive it, then it was not one of the,
requisites which must be preserved in order to preserve a jury
trial in civil actions." It is difficult to find arguments strong
enough to carry this position.
But, while the weight of authority is at present opposed to
permitting this rule to be established by statute, there would
seem to be no valid objection to permitting it to be done by
constitutional provisions. Yet even then, such a provision.
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will not authorize the legislature to provide for certain contingencies in which a jury shall consist of less than twelve
men, in the discretion of the trial court: McRae v. Grand
Rapids, L. & D. R. Co., 93 Mich. 399; S. C., 53 N. W. Rep.
56i.
The preceding observations, however, apply only to civil
actions. In criminal suits, the defendant can neither waive his
right to be tried by a jury of twelve, nor be deprived by the
legislature of his right to the unanimous verdict of those
twelve: Allen v. State, 54 Ind. 461 ; Canceni v. Peo., i8
N. Y. 128. Whether this right can be affected by constitutional provisions, is a doubtful question.
When the facts furnished by a client to his attorney are misleading, and defamatory in character, and their incorporation
into the petition is foreign to the object and purLibel,
In Pleading poses of the suit, the client is responsible in
damages: Wimbish v. Hamilton, (Supreme Court of Louisiana,) 16 So. Rep. 856.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has very properly ruled,.
that an offer by the publisher of a newspaper, made pending a
suit against him for a libel, to open the columns of
Retraction
the paper to the plaintiff for any explanation or
statement he wishes to make, counts for nothing on the trial of
the action : Constitut'on Pub. Co. v. Way, 21 S. E. Rep. 1 39.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, when a land-owner, by means of openings on his
own land and subterranean passageways leading
Limitation
of Actions
therefrom; mines and removes coal from adjoining
land of another without his knowledge, the latter having also
no means of obtaining knowledge of the trespass, the limitation,
of his right of action for compensation does not begin to run
until he discovers the trespass, or until discovery is reasonably possible: Lewey v. H. C. Frick Coke Co., 3' At1. Rep. 2,6.
A finding by the examining court that there was probable
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cause to believe the plaintiff guilty of the crime charged, and
the binding of him over for trial, is only prima
Malicious
Prosecution, facie evidence of probable cause; and further,
Probable
probable cause cannot be shown by admissions of
Cause

the plaintiff after his arrest, nor by the finding of
property on his premises, similar to that stolen, if that fact was
not known to the defendant when he began the prosecution:
Louisville N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Hendricks, (Appellate Court
of Indiana,) 40 N. E. Rep. 82.
An experienced lineman, who is provided with non-conducting rubber gloves, but does not use them, and is
Master
and Servant,
Assumption
of Risk

killed by touching the exposed ends of live wires,
which were perfectly obvious to the view, must be
held to have assumed the
risk: Junior v. Mz-

souri Electric Light & Power Co., (Supreme Court of Missouri,)
29 S. W. Rep. 988.
The Queen's Bench Division of England has lately decided
a very peculiar case. While an omnibus belonging to the
defendants was being driven by their servant, a
Deputing
Authority
policeman, being of opinion that the driver was
drunk, ordered him to cease driving at once. The driver and
the conductor of the omnibus thereupon authorized a third
person, who was passing, to drive the omnibus home on their
master's behalf. That person, while driving, negligently drove
over the plaintiff and injured him. The court held, that as,
under the circumstances, the servants of the defendants had
an implied authority to appoint another person to act as a servant on their master's behalf, it being a case of sudden emergency, the defendant was liable: Gwilliam v. Twist, [1895]
i Q. B. 557.
According to the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth
Department, the trainmen of a railroad company which runs
its trains over the road of the defendant company,
under a contract by which the superintendent of
the latter arrange all the time tables and controls the conductors of the other company, are not fellow-servants with the
employes of the defendant, though the same person is general
Fellow.
servants
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manager of both roads, and one person is superintendent of
both on the division where the accident occurred: Tierney v.
Syracuse, B. & N. Y R. Co., 32 N. Y. Suppl. 627.
The Court of Appeals of New York has recently held, in
Cameron v. N. Y Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 4o N. E. Rep. i,
Negligence of that when a servant is competent when employed,
Feiow-serbut afterwards becomes habitually negligent, and
varnt,

causes the death of a fellow-servant by his violation of the employer's rules, the employer will not be liable,
on the ground of negligence in failing to discover the servant's.
habitual misconduct, and in omitting to discharge him, if the
work of the servant is of such a nature that the employer
has no opportunity to learn of his misconduct, and it is not
reported by his fellow-servants, although they were under positive instructions to report all violations of rules.
One of the absurd claims ever made in a court of law was
lately rejected by the Supreme Court of Indiana, in Abbitt v.
Lake Erie & W. R. R. Co., 4o N. E. Rep. 40.
Negligence
Two car inspectors were at work at night, one
Imputed,
under the car, changing a coupler, and the other
Feiiow-ser.
Notice

vant

holding a torch to light him, when the employes
of another company backed down upon them, without notice
or warning, and the inspector under the cars was killed. The
attorney for the company asked for an instruction which in
effect would have imputed the negligence of the inspector with
the torch, in not looking for the backing train, to the one under
the car; but this was refused by the trial court, and the refusal
was approved by the Supreme Court, HOWARD, J., saying tersely,
" It is usually quite enough for a person to be responsible for
his own negligence, without being called upon to answer for
the negligence of some one else."
The Supreme Court of Georgia has recently held, that
when a husband has abandoned his wife and child, and failed
to provide for them, the wife, while living separate
injury to
Child,
from her husband and having the entire care and
Action by
Mother

custody of the child, may maintain an action
against a railway company for injuries to the child caused by
the negligence of the company since the separation took
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-place, by reason of which she is deprived of his services:
Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 21 S. E. Rep. 15 7.
According to the same court, the following questions: (i)
Whether a railway company, having stopped a train immediRailroad,
ately after the conductor called out the station,
Questions for failed in extraordinary diligence towards the plainJury,
Non-suit

tiff by not warning him thatthe station had not been
reached, so as to prevent him from alighting in the darkness of
the night at an unsafe place; and (2) Whether the plaintiff was
negligent in so alighting without first assuring himself that the
station had been reached or that the place was safe, are more
proper for submission to a jury than for determination by the
court on a motion for non-suit: Miller v. East Tenn., V. & G.
Ry. Co., 21 S. E. Rep. 153. The non-suit granted in this
case was accordingly set aside.

When the water of a natural stream is polluted by the discharge of drainage therein by a city, and also by the discharge
Nuisance,
of noxious matter from gas works owned by a
Joint
private individual, to the injury of one through
Liability,
whose lands the stream flows, the city and owner
Release
of the gas works, though not joint tort-feasors, are jointly and
severally liable in damages ; but a release of the owner of the
works will not release the city from liability, unless execuied
in full satisfaction of all the injury sustained by reason of the
nuisance: Cit of Valparaiso v. 1offit, (Appellate Court of
Indiana,) 39 N. E. Rep. 909.

The son of a clerk of court, acting as his father's deputy,
and generally recognized as such, is an officer de facto with
Officer de facto, respect to his acts in that capacity; and an affiMinor
davit in attachment made before him is not void,
although, on account of his minority, he could not have been
lawfully appointed as deputy: Viinberly v. Boland, (Supreme
-Court of Mississippi,) 16 So. Rep. 9o5.
The Court of Appeals of New York has lately rendered a
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very interesting decision, to the effect that under the statute of
that state, (New York Laws, 1885, c. 364,)
providing for the retirement on pension of
members of the police force of the
city of New
York, who have served twenty years or upward, the police
commissioners have a discretionary power to retire members
of the force, and cannot be compelled to do so by mandamus:
Peo. v. Martin, 39 N. E. Rep. 96o.
Pensions,
Retirement,
DIscretion

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has recently held, in
accord with the weight of authority, that the governor of a
state has power to pardon a person convicted of
Pardon,
Effect
crime after he has served his term of imprisonment, and that such a pardon will restore the person to competency as a witness on the trial of an action, the right of which
accrued before the pardon was granted: Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. Co. of Texas v. Howell, 30 S. W. Rep. 98.
The Supreme Court of New York, Second Department,
has lately ruled, in In re Quigley, 32 N. Y. Suppl. 828, that
a police justice, who, during a strike of the em-ceJustice,
Misconduct ployes of a street railway company, discharged
Removal
strikers who were arrested and brought before
him, charged with throwing stones at the cars and -assaulting
the main operator of the cars, in spite of the evidence against
them, and who stated that the strikers had a perfect right to
take men off the cars if they could do so in an orderly way,
is guilty of such misconduct as to warrant his removal.
In Frame v. Felix, 31 Atl. Rep. 375, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has held, that if a board of city commissioners,
in specifications for work to be done, fix a miniPublic
Contracts,
mum price to be paid by the contractor for labor,
Awarding
and award the contract for the work on the basis
of those specifications, their action is a violation of a statutory
provision requiring such work to be awarded to the lowest
responsible bidder, and is void, and may be set aside on bill
filed by a tax-payer and property owner.
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According to the Supreme Court of Illinois, a receiver
appointed by an Illinois court on a creditor's bill to enforce
an Illinois judgment may hold the debtor's assets
Receiver.
Right to
as against an attaching creditor, who is a citizen
Assets
of Illinois, even though the bill was brought by a
citizen of New York; the mere fact that the creditor who
brought the bill is a non-resident does not make the enforcement of the judgment a matter of comity, when the ancillary
proceedings are brought in the same state: Holbrook v. Ford,
39 N. E. Rep. io9.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has just rendered a
very interesting decision on the question of the right of a
parent whose child has been expelled from boardSchools,
Private,
ing school to recover advance payments for tuition,.
Advance
as follows: (i) When the evidence shows that it
Payments,
Recovery on is the understanding between the parties that, in
Cxpulsion
case of expulsion of the pupil
for misconduct,.
advance payments should be liquidated damages, and not
recoverable, and the rules of the school provide that there will
be no reduction in, case of withdrawals, and that all payments
will be forfeited on expulsion, there can be no recovery; (2)
That the conduct of a pupil at a boarding school, in continually playing truant, and finally leaving for his home, is
ground for expulsion; especially when the father refuses to
permit the teacher to whip his son for misconduct, and takes
no steps himself to correct him: Fessmnan v. Seeley, 30 S. W.
Rep. 268.
The Court of Appeal of England has recently laid down
the broad rule that an action of slander will lie,
Slander,
Misconduct without proof of special damage, for words imputing
of Public
dishonesty or malversation in a public office of
Officer
trust, although the office is not one
of profit, and
whether there is a power of removal from the office for such
misconduct or not: Booth v. Arnold, [1895] I Q. B. 571.
A difference in the punctuation of similar statutes does not
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necessarily indicate a change in the construction; especially

stattes,

when the punctuation is the work of the printer,
Gnffiths v. Montandon,

Pufct"tiod not of the legislature:

(Supreme Court of Idaho,) 59 Pac. Rep, 548,
See 34 Cent, L, J. 23.
The Supreme Court of the United States has added another
laurel to the crown it has of late been so industriously weaving:
for itself by deciding, by a vote of five to four, that
the Income Tax act is wholly unconstitutional, on.
the ground that an income tax is a direct tax, and therefore
must be apportioned according to representation. This result
was brought about by a change of heart on the part of one
Mr. Justice SRInAs, of Pennsylvania.
The Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York
has lately ruled, in Wfdliam Rogers Mfg. Co. v. R. W RogersTradeMark, Ca., 66 Fed. Rep. 56, that the rule that the user
Use of Names of a personal name as a trade-mark will not be
protected against its use in good faith by a defendant who has
the same name, does not apply to the case of a corporation,.
which selects its own name, especially when that name was.
selected in order to mislead.
The owner of land, across which there is a private way forpassage only, has the right to protect his fields byWays,
Private,
such a gate or other structure as will not unreaObstruction sonably obstruct the use of the way: Hartman vFick, (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,) 31 Atl. Rep. 342The Master of the Rolls of Ireland has recently decided,
that a gift over of. real estate in the event of the
win,
Condition devisee marrying a man "beneath her in life, that
in restraint

of Marriage is to say, below her in social position," is good .
Greene v. Kirkwood, i Ir. R. 130.
In a recent case in the Court of Chancery for Ireland, a
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decedent by her will declared that she had certain sums of
Bank" and
Demonstrative money on deposit in " the Australian
Legacy,
another, and bequeathed to certain legatees
Dnsccurate
specific portions of the gross amount. She had,
however, no sum on deposit in either bank, but
had, standing in her name, eleven shares in the Union Bank
of Australia. The vice-chancellor accordingly held that these
shares passed under the-bequest of the sum on deposit in the
Australian Bank: lkfosse v. Cranfield,[1895] I Ir. R. 8o.
A devise of No. 204 Lexington avenue, when the only
premises owned by the testator on that avenue, both at the
time of the execution of the will and of his death, were N6.
738 Lexington avenue, and he never at any time owned No.
204, will pass No. 738: Govin v. Metz, 29 N. Y. Suppl. 988;
and directions to an executor to sell a house and lot in N.,
and.pay certain legacies out of the proceeds, empowers him,
in the light of evidence that the testatrix owned no realty
except a house and lot in B., a suburb of N., to sell and make
title to the property in B.: Hawkins v. Young, (N. J.,) 29
AtI. Rep. 51 .
A belief in spiritualism is not conclusive evidence of a want
Insane
of testamentary capacity, provided the testator is
Delusion,
not affected with any delusion respecting matters
Spiritualism

of fact connected with the making of the will or

the objects of his bounty: McClary v. Stull, (Supreme Court
of Nebraska,) 62 N. W. Rep. 5Ol.

See 31 Am. L. REG. 505,

569.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana has lately ruled, in
Gravely v. Southern Ice Machine Co., 16 So. Rep. 866, that
any service which would be sufficient as against a
Writ,
Service in

Corporation

domestic corporation may be authorized by statute

as sufficient to commence an action against a

foreign or non-resident corporation; and that such service may
therefore be made upon the president of a foreign corporation
during the time he is temporarily abiding within the jurisdiction of the court in which the suit is brought.
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, has
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recently held, that in a personal action against a foreign corporation, neither doing business within the state, nor having
an agent or property therein, the service of a summons on its
president, while temporarily within the jurisdiction, is not a
sufficient serivice on the corporation: Goldey v. Mornixg News
vf New Haven, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559; affirming 42 Fed.
Rep. 112. To the same effect is Fidelity Trust & Safety
Vault Co. v. Mobile St. Ry. Co., 53 Fed. Rep. 85o.

